OSHI

The Messenger Security Review

How encrypted messengers are actually broken into — and what the cipher never promised to stop. Every piece here cites what it stands on, and when a finding applies to OSHI, it is published here as well.

The reference piece

11 articles

Endpoints · Linked devices

Reading Signal without breaking it

German customs investigators have been reading WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram since the end of 2023 with no malware and no attack on the cryptography. They add a second device to your account. The maths never fails — and that is the problem.

13 September 2026  ·  ~5 min

Read the piece
Opening card for the reference article “Reading Signal without breaking it”

All articles

Updated 13 September 2026

Account takeover · Linked devices

The QR code that adds a stranger to your account

A French government alert this March describes an account takeover that needs no exploit whatsoever: you are asked to scan a QR code, and the code enrols a device that is not yours. There is a second road in the same alert, and it is worse.

13 September 2026  ·  ~6 min

Targeted attacks · Social engineering

Spear-phishing does not care about your cryptography

State-linked actors have spent the past year going after the Signal and WhatsApp accounts of European officials. Throughout, the cryptography did precisely what it promises.

13 September 2026  ·  ~6 min

Identity · Key verification

How do you know that key is theirs?

Encryption protects a conversation between two public keys. Deciding that those keys belong to the people you meant is a different problem, it has never been solved comfortably, and in August 2026 Signal shipped the most serious attempt so far.

13 September 2026  ·  ~6 min

Cryptography · Post-quantum

The ratchet is the hard part

A key-encapsulation mechanism hands you one shared secret. A conversation needs a fresh one forever, in both directions, over a network that drops and reorders.

13 September 2026  ·  ~7 min

Endpoints · Post-compromise security

After the break-in

Post-compromise security is a real, provable property of a key schedule, and it is worth having. It also only exists if the ratchet actually turns — ours did not — and it stops at the edge of the device, every time.

13 September 2026  ·  ~7 min

Metadata · Traffic analysis

Everything around the message

A messenger can encrypt content perfectly and still hand an observer who talks to whom, when, how often and from where. That residue is not a footnote to the threat model.

13 September 2026  ·  ~6 min

Policy · Client-side scanning

Scanning the endpoint you promised not to touch

Europe has spent four years trying to write a law that detects illegal content inside conversations nobody can read. The cipher survives every draft.

13 September 2026  ·  ~7 min

Endpoints · Key management

The second device is the whole problem

One device is a solved problem. Add a laptop, a tablet and the phone you replaced last year, and the hard part stops being the cipher: it becomes bookkeeping.

13 September 2026  ·  ~7 min

Architecture · Identity and metadata

What a messenger has to know about you

Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, Olvid, SimpleX, Session, Briar, Matrix. They agree almost completely on how to encrypt a message and disagree completely on what has to be true before one can be sent — which is the part that decides what a subpoena gets.

13 September 2026  ·  ~8 min

AI · Endpoints and plaintext

The assistant has to read it

AI reached encrypted messaging from two directions at once: as the thing writing the convincing message, and as the helpful feature that has to be handed the plaintext before it can help. Only the second one is a design decision you get to make.

13 September 2026  ·  ~8 min

How this blog is written

About the notes under each article. They are open to anyone, with no account and no name, and nothing is stored about the person writing — no address, no browser string. They are also published immediately, without review, so they are capped at 160 characters and a link typed there is never made clickable.